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Summary findings
The AIDS crisis in Africa and elsewhere compels us to  loans than private transfers, for up to a year after a
design appropriate  assistance policies for households  death. This suggests that credit acts as insurance for
experiencing a death. Policies should take into account  households where informal interhousehold  assistance
and strengthen existing household coping strategies,  contracts are not enforceable. A donor in Kagera can be
rather than duplicate or undermine them.  sure that assistance to a wealthy household will be
Lundberg, Over, and Mujinja investigate the nature of  reciprocated, whereas a poor household may not be able
coping mechanisms among a sample of households in  to return the favor. Assistance to the poor is more likely
Kagera, Tanzania in 1991-94. They estimate the  to come with more formal arrangements for repayment.
magnitude and timing of receipts of private transfers,  Formal-sector assistance is targeted toward the poor
credit, and public assistance by households with different  immediately following the death.
characteristics. Their empirical strategy addresses three  The impact of adult deaths on households may be
common methodological difficulties in estimating the  mitigated either ex ante, through programs that minimize
impact of adult death: selection bias, endogeneity, and  poverty and vulnerability, or ex post, by assistance
unobserved heterogeneity.  targeted to the poorest and most vulnerable households.
Lundberg, Over, and Mujinja find that less-poor  In addition, to the extent to which micro-credit
households (those with more physical and human capital)  programs improve access and lower the total costs of
benefit from larger receipts of private assistance than  borrowing, they may not only stimulate growth and
poor households. Resource-abundant households are  investment but also help resource-poor households
wealthy in social assets as well as physical assets. Poor  overcome the impact of an adult death in the areas hard-
households, on the other hand, rely relatively more on  hit by the AIDS epidemic.
This paper-a  product  of Infrastructure  and  Environment,  Development  Research Group-extends  research  on the
household-level impact of adult death which informed the World Bank Policy Research Report Confronting AIDS: Public
Priorities in a  Global Epidemic.  Copies of this paper  are available free from  the World  Bank, 1818  H  Street NW,
Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Viktor Soukhanov, room MC2-523, telephone 202-473-5271,  fax 202-522-3230,
email  address  vsoukhanov@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at
www.worldbank.org/research/working  papers.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  mlundberg@worldbank.org,
meadover@worldbank.org,  or pmujinja@muchs.ac.tz.  December 2000.  (30 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of  work in progress to encourage the exchange of  ideas about
development issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not  necessarily  represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they  represent.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterSOURCES  OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE  FOR HOUSEHOLDS
SUFFERING AN ADULT  DEATH IN KAGERA,  TANZANIA
Mattias Lundberg, Mead Over, Phare Mujinjal
'Michigan  State University and the World Bank, the World Bank, and the Muhimbili University College of
Health Sciences, respectively; email addresses mlundberg®worldbank.org  and meadover(Aworldbank.org and
pmujinjai,muchs.ac.tz.  We thank USAID, DANIDA, the World Bank Research Committee and UNAIDS for
research support.  The data collection was the product of a collaborative effort by a team including Martha
Ainsworth, Godlike Koda, Innocent Semali, George Lwihula and the second and third authors.  Stefano
Bertozzi, Joe Kutzin, Indrani Gupta, Kathleen Beegle and Daniel Dorsainvil contributed to data preparation.
Seminar participants at the University of East Anglia and at the Workshop on the Economics of AIDS
organized by the International AIDS Economics Network in Durban, South Africa provided helpful comments
on an earlier draft.  Lundberg would also like to thank the Overseas Development Group of the University of
East Anglia for a generous research fellowship.The entire village is in mourning, but every household is mourning in its own way.
(Kagera villager 2)
All happy families  are alike, but each unhappy  family  is unhappy in its own way.
(Tolstoy, Anna Karenina)
Introduction
This paper examines some of the ways in which households respond to tragedy.  Using a
panel dataset from the Kagera region of western Tanzania, we examine household responses to death;
with a special focus on the ravages of HIV and AIDS.  The ability to cope means ensuring not only
the welfare of household members around the time of the death, but also their well-being in the
future.  While death is among the most severe traumas that can visit a household, some are able to
overcome even this crisis.
AIDS has been reported in nearly every country in the world; but more than 90 percent of
adult HIV infections are in developing countries, and more than 60 percent, around 25 million, are in
sub-Saharan Africa (UNAIDS 2000).  By the end of 1999, more than 50 million people had been
infected with HIV, and 19 million had already died from AIDS and AIDS-related illnesses (ibid.).
More than 12 million children in sub-Saharan Africa have been orphaned by AIDS (ibid.). In 1999,
roughly 5.4 million more people became infected with HIV world-wide; two-thirds of these new HIV
infections were in sub-Saharan Africa (ibid.).
AIDS has had a horrifying impact on life and health in central and southern Africa.  In
Zimbabwe, for example, estimated life expectancy at birth is 22 years shorter than it would have been
in the absence of AIDS (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996, 1997). By the end of 1999, an estimated 1.3
million people were living with HIV in Tanzania, and more than one million had died of AIDS
(UNAIDS 2000). HIV prevalence among those attending antenatal clinics in Dares  Salaam rose
from four percent in 1986 to 14 percent in 1995/96 (UNAIDS 1998). More than ten percent of
children under 15 in Uganda, and more than three percent in Tanzania, have lost their mother or both
parents to AIDS (UNICEF 1999). In Tanzania, 20 percent of under-five mortality is due directly to
AIDS (ibid.).  A study from the Mwanza region of Tanzania (Boerma et al. 1997) found that AIDS
had increased mortality rates by one-third: an estimated 42 percent of today's  1  5-year-olds will die
before their sixtieth birthday.
Projections of the consequences for economic growth vary, but it has been estimated that the
AIDS epidemic will reduce the growth of GDP per capita in Tanzania by .10 to .90 percent per year(Cuddington 1993, Over 1992; Bloom and Mahal 1997). Most studies from central and southern
Africa show that HIV infection rates are higher among the wealthier and more educated segments of
the population (Ainsworth and Semali 1998). AIDS is ravaging the ranks of the skilled and educated,
with potentially tragic consequences for future growth.  The AIDS epidemic is consuming a greater
share of government resources that could have been put to other uses.  World Bank research indicates
that in poor countries, the annual average cost of treating one AIDS patient was significantly greater
than the annual cost of educating ten primary school students (World Bank 1999). Compounding the
impact on aggregate growth, the children of HIV-infected parents may be withdrawn from school if
the family can no longer pay fees or buy supplies, or if the child's labor is needed at home, on the
farm, or in the marketplace.
The consequences of HIV and AIDS for the household are not the same as other diseases and
other causes of death.  Because the virus is mainly sexually transmitted, AIDS usually strikes prime-
age adults, at the peak of their productive and income-earning years, who are often heads of families.
Other things being equal, fatal illness increases household expenses (for health care, and ultimately
funerals) at the same time as it reduces household income (due to diminishedlabor time).  Yet
according to preliminary work using this dataset, households are at least partly able to compensate
for, and in time recover from, the death of a family member (see e.g. Overet al. 1996). We will try to
understand one way in which households cope, by looking at the household's  receipt of transfers and
other unearned income around a death.  We will also attempt to shed some light on the following
questions:
*  How well do informal institutions for risk-spreading help households after a death?
*  How effectively do formal-sector interventions support household coping efforts?
*  What policies might be implemented to increase the effectiveness of local risk-bearing
institutions?
Previous research using this dataset has found that vulnerability to shocks varies across
households, and this may significantly affect the path of development and the distribution of well-
being in the long run.  This confirms research from other areas which shows that the risk-mitigating
actions of households lead to slower growth as well as lower current income (Rosenzweig and
Wolpin 1993, Platteau 1991, Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1989; Banerjee and Newman  1993, 1998).
It has also been suggested that mechanisms for informal insurance are fragile and incomplete
- they work best for small idiosyncratic shocks, and do not adequately protect the poorest Qalan and
Ravallion  1997; Alderman and Paxson 1992; Coate and Ravallion  1989). Even when it does work,
2 Quoted  in Rugalema  1999.
2informal insurance may lead to greater divisions between rich and poor Fafchamps  1992; Hoff
1998).
Thus there is considerable opportunity for public sector intervention, but it is necessary to see
where are the gaps in the household's  ability to self-insure.  What are the unique characteristics of
households that cope successfully that enable them to overcome the tragedy relatively quickly?  We
identify three sources of financial assistance available to households following a death: private
transfers, private borrowing, and assistance from public or other formal organizations.  The evidence
suggests that on average, private transfers provide by far the majority of assistance, but not all
households rely equally on these sources. Some households benefit more from private assistance
networks, while others depend relatively more on credit or formal assistance.
There is some evidence that assistance from public institutions orNGOs may "crowd out"
private assistance: that is, reduce the incentive for private donors to provide assistance (see e.g. Cox
and Jimenez 1992).  Estimates of this crowding out effect range from negative one-for-one (Becker
1974) to positive, where public assistance actually stimulates private transfers (ampman  and
Smeeding 1983). The descriptive evidence from Kagera is that private transfer receipts increase with
income.  In that case, even if there is some crowding out of private transfers, the loss to the poor is
relatively small; and the net social benefit of public transfers may be positive.  In an earlier version of
this paper we could not find any impact of formal assistance on private transfers.  In any event, we do
not model the crowding-out effect here.
The evidence suggests that households differ systematically in the characteristics and factors
that condition the household's  response to the crisis.  Previous research has established that the
epidemic is more likely to affect some segments of the population before others (Ainsworth and
Semali 1998), and that the impact of the crisis differs significantly across, for example, wealth class
(World Bank 1999). In order to identify the determinants of the household's  receipt of financial
assistance, we need to control for the household-specific factors that influence both the household's
exposure to the epidemic and the nature of its response.  In the analysis below, we therefore control
for attrition bias, endogeneity, and unobserved heterogeneity.  The plan of the paper is as follows: we
first describe the survey and data; next, we examine the use of finance from the three sources
mentioned above and correlate receipts with death and a range of household characteristics.  Finally,
we discard the unrealistic assumptions supporting the descriptive analysis (homogeneity and
exogeneity) to reveal robust and generalizable links between a household's  characteristics and access
to and use of various sources of financial assistance.
3Survey description
The data come from a four-round panel survey in the Kagera region of northwestern
Tanzania, conducted between 1990 and 1994. The region is west of Lake Victoria and borders the
Rakai district of Uganda to the north, and Rwanda and Burundi to the west.  More than 80 percent of
the population lives in the rural areas, most of them in agriculture.  The farming system consists of
tree crops (bananas and coffee), annual crops (maize, sorghum and cotton) and livestock.
Adult mortality is relatively high inKagera, partly due to the early spread of HIV and AIDS.
The first recorded case of AIDS in the region was in 1983, but the virus was probably present at least
a decade earlier.  The region is a crossroads for goods traffic, and was affected by the war between
Tanzania and Uganda in the late 1970s. More recently, it has provided a haven for refugees fleeing
Rwanda and Burundi.
A population-based seroprevalence survey in Bukoba, the regional capital, in 1987, found
that roughly a quarter of the prime-aged (15-50) adults were infected with HIV, as were up to 10
percent in the surrounding areas.
Although AIDS has severely affected parts of central and southern Africa, and is widely
prevalent in the survey region, it is not the largest cause of death in the sample.  The survey was
conducted over a three-year period from 1990 to 1994, during which some 9.6 percent of sample
individuals died (compared to a crude death rate in Tanzania of 1.4 percent in 1995 [World Bank
1999]). About 40 percent of sample deaths can be directly attributed to AIDS.  Including deaths in
the year prior to the survey period, 44 percent of household-wave observations have experienced a
death at some point in the past.
The region was stratified by cluster and village, and all households within selected villages
were given an initial enumeration survey.  From that enumeration, 838 households were selected to
receive the first round of the complete household survey.  Since adult mortality was still a relatively
rare event, households that indicated recent experience with severe illness in the initial enumeration
were oversampled.  Altogether, 913 households were interviewed at least once. 3 The total sample
consists of  3368 household-wave observations.
After each round, some households dropped out and were replaced.  Of the original sample
drawn from the enumeration, 6 percent dropped prior to their first interview.  Of the remaining
sample of households, 10 percent dropped out prior to the end of the survey (round 4) (Ainsworth
1995).  This attrition rate compares favorably to other panel surveys.  The surveys in the Luxembourg
3Although  816  households  were selected  from the enumeration  sample  for the first  round, a further  24
households  were added  by the field team from the list of replacement  households,  so that 840  households  were
interviewed  in round 1. One household  was mistakenly  interviewed  twice in each  round;  both sets of
observations  for  that household  were dropped,  yielding  a round I sample  of 838 households.
4Income Study, for example, have an average dropout rate of around 22 percent after three rounds, or
about 7 percent per round (Singh 1995); World Bank Living Standards Measurement Surveys have a
per-round dropout rate of about 12 percent (Glewwe and Jacoby 2000); and the Kagera study has a
per-round (per-wave) dropout rate of 2.5 percent.
It might be expected that those households that are most severely affected by a death are
more likely to drop out.  After all, only intact households can remain to be interviewed again, and the
disaster can be so severe as to destroy the household.  If that is the case, the sample is biased infavor
of "more successful," or less severely affected households.  This would minimize any measurement
of the impact of the disease, and weaken our ability to draw meaningful inferences from the analysis.
Exarmination  of the data does not suggest any systematic bias.  While households that drop out are
smaller, with fewer assets, they have younger household heads with more education.  Households that
drop out are also less likely to have suffered a death than households that remain. 4 This suggests that
more mobile households drop out, rather than more adversely affected ones.
Another source of potential bias in the data is that the replacement households may be
systematically different from the remaining population.  In addition, households joining the survey
after the first passage do not have the opportunity to complete all four waves.  For example, the
replacement households joining between waves 1 and 2 could at most complete three waves (2, 3, and
4).  If these households are systematically different, the fact that we observe them for a shorter
amount of time may further bias the results.  T-tests for significant differences between the
replacement households and the original population reveal that replacement households do receive
significantly fewer transfers and formal assistance.  This may reflect bias in the sample; on the other
hand, it more likely reflects the fact that the replacement households are also less likely to suffer a
death.  However, since the original sample was chosen with an oversampling of households with a
recent illness, it could be that the replacements are randomly drawn, but the original sample is biased
towards exaggerating the impact of a death.
Comparing replacement households with drop-out households does reveal some differences:
replacement households are wealthier, older, and larger than those that drop out, but there is no
difference in death experience.  While these casual examinations leads us to believe that there is no
bias in the sample, we control for both drop-out and replacement in the initial analysis below.  We
will show, however, that it is the household's characteristics underlying the probability of dropping
out which matter, and not the act of dropping out itself.  We control for these and other unobserved
characteristics in the econometric analysis.
4 T-tests  available.
5In much of the analysis below, we also drop 10 observations for which some data are
missing, and we drop 14 observations for which the dependent variables are extreme outliers - that is,
they fall outside the interval formed by the mean ± 10 standard deviations.  Five of these 14
observations are for households that have experienced a death in the past.
The impact of AIDS on households, and household responses to the crisis
Previous analysis of this dataset (see Over et al. 1996 and World Bank 1999) has found that
households with a death have higher total expenses as well as higher expenditures on all components
of consumption than households in which no death has occurred.  This is not because death makes
one wealthy, but because in this sample, wealthier households are more likely to suffer a death.
The impact of a death on well-being depends largely on the resources available to the
household.  Not all households suffer in the same way, or to the same extent, or for the same length of
time.  For the poorer half of households in the sample, both food expenditure and food consumption
fall dramatically in the six months following a death (Figure 1). For the non-poor half, food
expenditure and consumption actually rise following a death.  This again suggests that households are
heterogeneous both in the impact of the crisis and in the ways they respond to it.
Why does the impact of a death differ so dramatically across households?  If the ability to
cope differs across wealth class, is it simply that wealthier households are wealthier, and are better
"self-insured?"  However, the consequences of a death may differ according to the type of coping
mechanism used by the household, and not just the level.  To see this we must first examine the
characteristics of households in which people die, and how households respond to a death.  The
household can conceive of a hierarchy of responses to a crisis, which can be classified, for example,
by reversibility.  According to this criterion, re-allocating labour is preferable to selling productive
assets such as a bullock team.
The adverse events that households face can be distinguished by ubiquity and recurrence.
Some shocks affect only individual households, independently of others.  Non-infectious  illness,
injuries, and (except in epidemics) death are examples of such "idiosyncratic"  shocks.  Drought, in
contrast, usually affects entire regions.  Some shocks, such as unemployment, may be related both to
individual characteristics and common events such as business cycles.  Some shocks may be repeated
over time.  Deaton (1997) found that the ability of households to maintain consumption diminishes as
the "autocorrelation"  in shocks rises.  Households can draw on assets to smooth consumption over the
course of one drought; a succession of droughts is more difficult to overcome.  On the other hand,
some degree of repetition makes it possible to learn from experience - to apply the lessons learned
during one event to future events, thereby lessening their adverse consequences.  Gertler and Gruber
6(1997) found that households in Indonesia are better able to insure consumption against more
frequent risks such as illness and idiosyncratic unemployment than against rare shocks such as death.
Kinsey, Burger and Gunning (1998) argue that poor households are relatively constrained in
their choice of coping mechanisms: "the relatively poor tend to smooth income more than
consumption while the relatively wealthy tend to smooth consumption alone (p.90)."  The choice of
response may reflect limited opportunities among poor households, rather than differences in
preferences.
Table 1 presents bivariate correlations of the dependent variables (transfers, credit, and
official assistance), as well as a range of characteristics that may determine both the ability of the
household to withstand the shock and the household's  receipts of outside assistance.5 The first set of
columns compares means across death experience.  Households that have experienced a death receive
more net private transfers than households that have not suffered a death, but the difference is not
statistically significant.  They also receive less in credit than those without a death - in fact, those
with a death appear to be net lenders - but again the within-variance is sufficiently large to eliminate
differences between the groups.  Households with a death do receive more assistance from NGOs,
government, or other formal institutions.
As noted above, households with a death are larger and wealthier (in terms of physical
assets).  They are more likely to have older and female household heads.  Also, consistent with the
earlier discussion of attrition, households with a death are more likely to have arrived in wave I of the
survey and remain for all 4 waves.  Households with a death are less likely to drop out and less likely
to be chosen as a replacement.
The variables describing household human and physical capital are highly correlated with
each other.  The last two columns in the table give the factor loadings and coefficients for the first
principal components of these characteristics, which explain 82 percent of the variation in all 6
variables.  Since the coefficients are positive for all variables except the age of the household head,
the index can be interpreted loosely as an index of household resources (i.e. human and physical
capital).  We use the index in the empirical work in the following section. 6
Transfers and borrowing in response to an adult death
As mentioned earlier, the bereaved household can cope economically with a death in many
ways: seek financial assistance either from friends and relatives, or from a formal government or non-
government assistance agency; change the mix of crops grown on family plots; alter members' time
5 This  table includes  the 14 outliers  that we drop from the analysis  below.
7allocation between labor market participation, work at home and school; sell assets; recruit or shed
household members; or reduce consumption of some or all household members.  The objective of this
paper is to learn more about the receipt of formal and informal transfers and credit.
Private inter-household transfers are observed throughout the world, and they often comprise
a significant part of household income.  More than 90 percent of rural households in India report
receiving private transfers (Cox and Jimenez  1990), as do 20-75 percent of households in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet republics (Barberia, Johnson and Kaufmann 1998), and 15 percent of
households in the U.S. (Cox and Jimenez 1990). Private transfers account for 39 percent of income
among the urban poor in El Salvador, nearly half of income among the poorest in Malaysia (ibid.),
and one-third to two-thirds of income in the transition economies of Eastern Europe q3arberia,
Johnson and Kaufmann 1998).
Why are there private transfers?  For what reason does a household give something to
another?  The motivations for these private actions have specific implications for public policy (see
e.g. Cox 1987). The choice of intervention depends significantly on the structure of existing,
"informal," institutions.  Transfers may be made in payment for some previous, unobserved,
transaction of goods or services.  In that case, they serve no insurance function at all.  On the other
hand, they may be motivated out of altruism: I care for you, and help you when you need it, and I
give no thought to what you might do for me.  It is simply your happiness that makes me happy.  In
the economics jargon, your welfare is an argument in my objective function.  Finally, transfers may
be a part of an informal insurance system: I will help you today, but with my help I am purchasing
your promise to help me in the future.  In other words, under the insurance interpretation, transfers are
either the purchase of future obligations, or repayment for past obligations.
Although casual comparisons show limited use of credit, and no difference across experience
of death, an empirically sound distinction between credit and transfers may be difficult to make.  It is
well known that credit can have an insurance function (cf. Evans-Pritchard 1940 and Scott 1976 on
reciprocal gift-giving, Platteau and Abraham 1987, Eswaran and Kotwal 1989, and Udry 1990, 1994
on credit).  Fafchamps and Lund (1998) argue that local informal assistance can be described as
"quasi-credit."  That is, when limited enforcement constrains participation in mutual assistance
programs, risk is mitigated by a combination of low- or zero-interest loans, combined with gifts.
However, there may be a significant difference between credit and transfers, in that the
former requires a more formal and explicit arrangement (even though that arrangement can be
flexible).  When the informal exchange contract is unenforceable, the donor will insist on a more
6 This  combination  also has the advantage  of outperforming  the log of assets  by itself as a proxy  for household
resources  in the regressions.
8formal arrangement that forces the recipient to reciprocate, or protects his donation with some
security.  To the extent that the loans are given at positive interest rates, or that collateral is pledged
with a positive probability of default, that increases the cost of finance relative to a scheme of
repeated interest-free mutual assistance.
This raises the question of the distribution of the sources of finance.  Do all households have
access to these resources?  Table 2 describes the incidence of (positive net) receipts by source.  We
distinguish in this table by (wave I) wealth and by death experience.  Among the poorer half of
households, 60 percent receive some formal assistance, less than half are net recipients of private
transfers, and one-sixth are net borrowers in the private credit market.  Among the wealthier half of
households, two-thirds receive some formal assistance, more than half are net recipients of private
transfers, and the same percentage are net borrowers in the private credit market.
There is a greater distinction between households that have experienced a death in the past
and those that have not.  The former are more likely to receive private transfers (60 percent v. 44
percent) and public assistance (68 percent v. 60 percent).  On the other hand, they are slightly less
likely to borrow (17 percent v. 18 percent).  The majority (56 percent) of the 670 poor households
that have experienced a death receive formal assistance, as does the majority (62 percent) of non-poor
households with a death.
While Table 2 shows that there is little difference in the incidence of access to sources of
financial assistance across wealth class - that is, the proportion of households using each source is
broadly similar - there may be greater differences in the amounts received across classes.  Figure 2
describes the cumulative distribution of transfers received. 7 The smooth curve rising monotonically
from zero to one is a Lorenz curve for total expenditures - in which equality is impliedby the
diagonal line from zero to one.  The other lines are concentration curves - that is, the proportion of
assistance from each source that go to each cumulative proportion of the total income (expenditure)
distribution.  In principle, if the curve depicting the distribution of an item is above the Lorenz curve,
it is relatively more equitable than the prevailing income distribution, in the sense that that segment of
the population receives a larger share of that item than it receives of aggregate income; if it is below
the Lorenz curve, that segment of the population receives proportionally less of it than would be
consistent with its share of aggregate income.  If the distribution curve is above the diagonal, then that
segment of the population also receives more in absolute terms than other parts of the population.
This figure shows that formal assistance is more equitably distributed than private transfers,
although both are progressively distributed (since they are both above the Lorenz curve).  The more
striking feature of this figure is the distribution of private credit (we superimpose a smoothed curve to
9ease interpretation).  These curves are all net, so that private transfers are those received minus those
given out, and credit is the difference between borrowing and lending.  The credit curve can be
interpreted in terms of progressivity, but it also shows that the poorer half of the population are net
borrowers, while the wealthier half are net lenders.  The poorer half, in this figure, borrow more than
they would be expected to if the distribution of credit reflected the prevailing income distribution;
they also borrow more than average, and they borrow more than the wealthy.  The credit curve is far
more variable in the top half of the income distribution, which reflects the fact that a few wealthy
households account for the majority of borrowing and lending activity.
Figure 2 shows that private assistance is proportional to total income (expenditure), but the
amount of both private transfers and formal assistance received by the poor is significantly less in
absolute terms than that received by the wealthy.  The wealthy are also more likely to receive private
transfers from other regions within Tanzania, or abroad. 8
Estimating transfer receipts and borrowing
If one were to solve a system of structural equations for all of these household response
variables for transfers received, ri,,,  as a function of whether there has been a death, Dj,,,  (a dummy
variable equal to one if a death has occurred to household i prior to period t), and the included
exogenous variables from all the equations, the result would be the following equation:
ri, =  ro +X,  rlI+9Di,  +7i  +es,  (1.)
where m  is a constant term,  Xi, is a row vector of all the exogenous variables included in all the
structural equations, 17 is a column vector of parameters and the parameter 6  measures the total
impact of death on remittances via both direct and indirect routes.  The error term is composed of two
parts: an unobserved, household-specific error i7i,  and a random error si,. Assuming that the
occurrence of a death is exogenous to the system of response variables and independent of the two
error terms, it would in theory be possible to estimate the parameter 0  consistently by ordinary least
squares.  More efficient estimates could be obtained by applying error components estimation
techniques.
While the data set contains a great many variables measured at the community level which
can reasonably be supposed to be exogenous to household decisions, deciding a priori which of these
variables belongs in each of the structural equations requires strong assumptions.  Rather than
7 All curves  are in terms of adult-equivalent  units.
s This  is in line  with the work  of Reardon,  Delgado  and Matlon  (1992)  who found  that households  invest in
migration  and  remittance  channels,  and Rosenzweig  (1988),  who found  that  households  in India arrange
marriages  for their daughters  to areas  with low income  covariance.
10attempting to distinguish those exogenous variables which directly affect one of the endogenous
response variables from those which have only indirect effects, we choose to move the vectorX,t of
exogenous variables into the error terms.  With this change, we rewrite equation (1) in the simpler
form:
r,, =  ;0 + a  Di,, + 77%  + e*i,,  (2.)
where the augmented error terms now include theXi,,  variables as follows
77i  + 6£t  =  X,,  +  j  +  . (3.)
If the augmented errors are independent of whether a death has occurred, it is possible to
estimate the response of transfers to death by ordinary least squares.  However, there are several
reasons to suspect that the errors are not independent.  Among the causes of possible correlation
between the errors and Di,,  are attrition bias in the sample and correlation between the excluded socio-
economic variables and DjJ .
Table 3 presents both ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variable (IV) estimates
of  the response of transfers to death.  In addition to a dummy variable for whether a death has
occurred, the regressions include two dummies for attrition.  One, called "Survey end" captures
households which could not complete all four waves because they started late, in passage 2 or later
rather than in passage 1. The other, called "Left Survey" equals one for households which could not
be interviewed despite an attempt by the survey team.9
Except for the time trend variable, all right-hand-side variables are instrumented in the IV
estimates of columns (2), (4) (6) and (8).  The Davidson-Mackinnon test rejects exogeneity of the
instrumented variables in three of the four equations, indicating that the OLS estimates are probably
inconsistent.  Comparison of the OLS and IV estimates in Table 3 reveals that correcting for
endogeneity dramatically increases the response of transfers to death by factors of 3.6, 6.9 and 7.3 for
the three components of total receipts and by a factor of 3.9 for the total (although the impact of death
is insignificant to private credit in this table).
In contradiction to the bivariate comparisons of Table 2, the IV estimates show two of the
three components of transfers, net private transfers and formal assistance, to respond significantly to
death, both in statistical terms and in relation to their absolute level. In a sample for which total net
receipts average 1,470 Tanzanian shillings per adult equivalent member each six months, the
household is estimated to receive an additional 5,300 shillings after a death.  The IV estimates of the
impact of death on receipt of private transfers are illustrated in Figure 3.
11Tables 4 and 5 relax the assumptions of Table 3 that transfers received respond to a death in
the same way for all households and that higher levels of receipts endure permanently after a death.
Table 4 allows response to vary across households in two specific ways.  Inclusion of the time since
the death and its square allows a response to become attenuated over time.  Estimation by error
components two-stage least squares (EC2SLS) controls for unobserved persistent household-specific
variables which affect receipts QBaltagi  1995).
First, note that the Davidson MacKinnon (1993) test rejects the use of OLS for private
transfers and formal assistance, although not for credit.  Note also that the Hausman test fails to reject
the use of EC2SLS against the fixed effects alternative.  Comparing IV to the more efficient EC2SLS
estimates, both death and time-since the death remain statistically significant.  On the other hand,
controlling for the household-specific error component renders the attrition variables insignificant,
suggesting that this technique successfully controls for the unmeasured household characteristics that
are associated with both receipts and attrition.
In Table 5, using only EC2SLS, we expand our analysis of the variation in transfer response
to consider the effect of household resources on the size and timing of receipts.  The results show that
receipts respond to death and to the time since the death, and that the response varies according to the
amount of household resources.  Household resources are indexed using the coefficients of the first
principal component as presented in Table 2.
The regressions indicate that receipts do respond to the death, and to the time since the death,
and that the response varies according to the resources the household can command.  We use the
results of the regressions to simulate the evolution of the household's receipts of assistance following
a death.  Figure 4 presents the simulation of the median household's receipts of total assistance (the
sum of private transfers, formal assistance, and private credit) for the 30 months following the death.
The solid curve shows the predicted receipts of total financial assistance; the dashed lines show the
90% confidence interval.  The vertical (left) axis depicts the rate of receipts in thousandTSh per
capita.  The horizontal line in each panel, labelled on the right axis, is the counterfactual estimate of
receipts for households that have not suffered a death.  The impact of a death on receipts is computed
as the statistically significant difference between the solid curve and the counterfactual.
9  In addition  to suggesting  the bias resulting  from  uncorrected  endogeneity  in estimating  household  responses,
Table  3 also  suggests  that attrition  matters:  the dummy  variables  representing  attrition  are statistically
significant  in the IV regressions.  But see the discussion  of Table  4 below.
12The median household receives financial assistance at the rate of about 30,000 TSh per yearl 1
immediately after the death, and continues to receive assistance until 18 months after the death." In
total, the median household receives roughly 144,000 TSh in financial assistance during that 18-
month period, which is more than this household's estimated per-capita expenditures for the period.
At first glance, this is evidence of a well-functioning informal insurance network.  The
bereaved household is significantly compensated for the death.  However, the question then arises
whether this insurance system exists for all households.  If so, does it function as well for all classes
of households?  To answer this question, we simulate the evolution of financial assistance following a
death for typical poor and wealthy households.  In addition, we distinguish financial assistance by
source, to see whether the private response to a death differs from the response of public and non-
governmental institutions.
The top three panels of Figure 5 (Sa, Sb and 5c) present the estimated response and its 90%
confidence interval for households at the tenth percentile of household resources; i.e. very poor
households.  The bottom three panels (Sd, 5e, and 5f) present the same calculations for a household at
the ninetieth percentile of household resources.  As in Figure 4, the horizontal line labelled at the right
border in each panel represents the estimated counterfactual: i.e. what would have happened in the
absence of a death.
Figure 5d shows that the less poor receive transfers at the rate of about 40,000 Tsh per
household member per year immediately after the death, and continue to receive private transfers
until between 18 and 30 months later.  On the other hand, the poorest households receive no
statistically identifiable private assistance (Figure 5a).
Contrast the picture for private transfers with those of formal assistance and private
borrowing.  The less poor also receive formal assistance, but not until about nine months after the
death.  They receive some, but not much, private credit.  On the other hand, the lack of significant
amounts of private transfers for the poorest households, apparently forces them to depend on the latter
two forms of receipts.  However the total amount flowing from these is less than ten thousand
shillings (per half-year) on the date of the death, half that received by the less poor on that day, and
poor households continue to receive transfers for only a year, as opposed to the eighteen months that
private transfers endure for the less poor (panels 5a and 5d).
'° The surveys  were conducted  at six-month  intervals,  and the figures  here  use the half-year  as the timne  unit.
The estimate  of 30,000  TSh per year is twice the point estimate  (14,600)  illustrated  in the figure;  in other  words,
the annualized  rate  at which  these  households  receive  transfers  immediately  following  a death.
l l We compute  the assistance  received  as the area  under the curve and above  the counterfactual,  from  the date of
the death  until  the date at which  the estimate  is not significantly  different  from zero  (that is, when  the 90%
confidence  interval  crosses  the counterfactual).
13The bottom of Table 5 presents estimates of the size of the response at the two ends of the
household resource distribution for the different components of receipts.  Six months after the death,
resource-rich households are receiving transfers at the annual rate of 27,000 TSh. At the same time,
the resource-poor households receive no private transfers, but do get assistance from formal
institutions at the rate of 4,400 TSh per year, and are borrowing an additional 4,600 TSh per year.
One year after the death, the rich are still receiving private transfers at a rate of 17,000TSh per year,
whereas the poor have stopped receiving any assistance, whether in the form of private transfers,
formal assistance, or credit.
Figure 6 and column (4) of Table 5 present the household's total receipts of financial
assistance, again by the number of months since the death and index of household resources.  In total,
the resource-poor household could possibly receive assistance at the rate of 18,800 TSh per adult
equivalent member one month after the death, which is a respectable half of the 37,000 TSh received
by the resource abundant household (though the estimate for the poor is not statistically significant).
If the distribution of financial assistance were maintained at this rate over time for all households, it
would be an impressively progressive allocation.  As a percentage of total income, the annual rate of
receipts would amount to a quarter of per-capita expenditure for the poor, and 13 percent of per-capita
expenditure for the rich.
Over the course of the first year following a death, poor households receive about 52,400 TSh
per capita, while rich households receive about 176,000 TSh per capita.'2 This is still progressive, as
it represents about 70 percent of total per-capita expenditures of the poor, and 63 percent of total per-
capita expenditures for the rich.  However, the receipts of assistance by resource-poor households
diminish rapidly with time, and are completely gone within one year after the death, while those of
the resource abundant household persist for almost two years.  While the total received by the poor is
52,400 TSh (all in the first year), the rich receive a total of about 280,000 TSh per capita in the 30
months following the death, coincidentally, exactly the annual per-capita expenditure among rich
households.
Conclusions
This paper has tried to understand one of the mechanisms by which households deal with a
death.  Clearly, some households fare much worse than others.  But that observation itself motivates
the key question: why do some households manage better than others?  The household's  human and
12 This is the integral  of the point estimate  curve in panels  6a and 6b, from 0 to 12  months after  the death,  above
the counterfactual.
14physical capital - the ability to self-insure - is part of the answer.  Households with sufficient
resources may not need formal-sector assistance.
Resource-abundant households rely more on private transfers, whereas resource-poor
households rely relatively more on credit.  These results seem to support the hypothesis of Fafchamps
and Lund, that credit acts as insurance in cases where informal contracts are not enforceable.  In
Kagera, a donor household will make transfers to a rich household, and trust that the recipient will
repay in the future.  There is an implicit contract for repayment.  For poor households, the contract
must be explicit: I will help you if you are poor and in crisis, but I want an explicit promise of
repayment, not merely an implicit one.  I don't  trust that you will be able to repay; I need some
guarantee.  If this is true, it means that the impact of the death is potentially even worse for poor
households - not only are they hit harder, but they must bear a larger part of the burden alone.
Thus resource-abundant households are wealthy not only in physical and human assets, but
also in "social" assets, or social capital.  They have a larger, broader, and presumably wealthier
network of friends and relatives on whom they can depend in times of crisis.  They are more likely to
receive private assistance, and they receive more assistance, than poorer households.  In an
environment of incomplete and unenforceable contracts, a larger social network provides greater
resources for common risk-pooling.
These quasi-insurance transactions are personalized functions of the characteristics of donor
and recipient, not impersonal market transactions.  The expected returns to gifts given depend on
information about the ability of the recipient to reciprocate in the future - that is, expected future
creditworthiness or vulnerability.  Thus it may be reasonable even for a poor donor to give more to a
wealthy recipient than to another poor recipient, if the expected returns to gifts made to a wealthy
household exceed those of gifts to a poor household.
Those outside the network, the resource-poor, can only have access to the risk-pooling
resources through formal credit contracts.  Even assuming the rate of interest is actuarially fair, the
cost of risk aversion is far greater for the poor than for the rich, since the risk of default and loss of
collateral is not zero.  For the rich, inability to reciprocate the assistance will reduce access to future
assistance, but will not imply the loss of currently productive assets.
What are the policy implications of these findings?  First, government and non-government
agencies made a substantial difference to resource poor households which had suffered an adult
deaths in Kagera, Tanzania in 1990-1994. According to the point estimates in Table 5, formal
sources accounted for more than a third of all financial assistance received by the poorest households
a month after the death.  Second, the amount of such formal assistance was substantial in absolute
terms.  Computing the integral under the estimated profile of formal assistance in panel 5b gives an
15estimated total of 30,500 Tsh per adult equivalent over the eighteen months until receipts cease.  At
an annual rate of 20,300 Tsh, or about 70 1991 US dollars, this amount compares favorably with
Tanzania's  1991 per capita GNP of 110 US dollars.
Third, since panel Se shows that resource abundant households receive assistance also,
though with a lower priority than do the poor households, suggests that formal assistance programs
could provide more assistance to the poorest households by limiting the amount given to the better-
off.  This suggestion must not be taken lightly, however, since strict adherence to progressive
targeting criteria can undermine the political support for a subsidy program (Sen, 1995, Gelbach and
Pritchett  1997). In addition, it is difficult to design accurate targeting mechanisms Cundberg and
Diskin 1995), and attempts to reduce false positives (capture by non-needy households) often lead to
increases in false negatives (omitting truly needy households).
Finally, resource poor households in Kagera avail themselves even more of loans than they
do of formal assistance in response to a death.  And they do so even more than do resource abundant
households.  Many of the loans taken in this sample may be "quasi-credit," that is, flexible
arrangements in which repayment is contingent on changes in the fortunes of borrower and lender.
The Kagera survey did not elicit interest rates, so further data is required before we can estimate the
actual costs of borrowing; but it is safe to say that the costs of insuring consumption against a death
are higher for poor households than non-poor households.  Credit and transfers are structurally
different: interest rates on loans are likely to be positive, and loans may require the borrower to forfeit
collateral with a positive probability of default.  The evidence suggests that the poor are excluded
from the relatively more flexible transfer scheme, and rely more on private credit.  Thus, to the extent
that micro-credit programs improve access and lower the total costs of borrowing, they may be
effective not only for their usual purpose of stimulating investment in micro-enterprises, but also in
helping the most resource poor households to cope with the impacts of an adult death in areas hard-hit
by the AIDS epidemic.
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19Table 1. Descriptive Statistics, by Death Experience
No death  Any dth  Principal components
Variable  name  mean  sd  mean  sd  t-test  Factor  Regression
loadings parametersb
Net private  transfersa  1.041  (23.199)  1.931  (16.671)  (1.243)
Formal assistancea  0.341  (1.843)  0.520  (1.691)  (2.895) **
Net private credita  0.135  (5.335)  -0.077  (2.810)  (1.383)
Total receipts'  1.517  (24.160)  2.374  (17.261)  (1.151)
Attrition  0.053  (0.225)  0.039  (0.193)  (2.004) *
Survey end  0.067  (0.250)  0.037  (0.190)  (3.892) **
Log assets  2.491  (0.658)  2.584  (0.611)  (4.244) **  0.458  0.436
Log BMI  1.313  (0.049)  1.313  (0.048)  (0.138)  0.276  2.407
Male hh head  0.785  (0.411)  0.658  (0.475)  (8.138) **  0.437  0.454
HH head age  48.576  (16.207)  50.031  (18.116)  (2.419) *  -0.291  -0.009
HHheadeducation  4.158  (3.172)  4.133  (3.205)  (0.223)  0.614  0.120
Log RAAE  0.472  (0.226)  0.497  (0.222)  (3.208) **  0.352  0.772
Resources index  0.004  (0.760)  -0.005  (0.777)  (0.334)
Death  0.000  1.000
Time since death  0.000  19.188  (10.740)
Time since death squared  0.000  483.438  (450.364)
Resources  X Death  0.000  -0.005  (0.777)
Resources  X Time since death  0.000  -0.718  (16.458)
Resources  X Time since death squared  0.000  -26.737  (482.316)
N  1896  1462
a Thousand TSh per adult equivalent.
b OLS, intercept= -5.012.
Zero variance: variable is a constant.
* significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%, + significant at 10%.
20Table 2.  Incidence of assistance by source
Private  Formal  Private  Total  Number of
transfers  assistance  credit  assistance  households
Poor households  812  1030  293  1092  1686
with death  379  445  105  498  670
without  death  433  585  188  594  1016
Non-poor  households  895  1119  295  1076  1682
with  death  491  560  140  575  800
without  death  404  559  155  501  882
All households
with death  870  1005  245  1073  1470
without  death  837  1144  343  1095  1898
Number  of households  1707  2149  588  2168  3368
receiving  assistance
21Table 3. Household Receipts of Transfers and Credit, Controlling for Endogeneity
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Net private transfers  Formal assistance  Net private credit  Total net receipts
OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV
Death  1.222  4.478  0.167  1.150  -0.048  -0.347  1.341  5.281
(4.62) **  (3.91) *1  (4.75) **  (5.48) **  (0.68)  (1.27)  (4.71) **  (4.50) **
Left survey  -0.558  15.122  0.033  -4.491  0.140  -0.329  -0.384  10.302
(0.88)  (3.07) **  (0.40)  (4.98) **  (0.83)  (0.28)  (0.57)  (2.05) *
Survey end  -0.867  -7.396  0.065  2.498  0.208  -0.660  -0.594  -5.558
(1.49)  (1.88) +  (0.84)  (3.46)  *  (1.33)  (0.70)  (0.95)  (1.38)
Elapsed time  6.886  19.210  1.700  -3.071  0.681  0.992  9.267  17.131
(2.75) **  (3.80) **  (5.10) **  (3.31) **  (1.02)  (0.82)  (3.44) **  (3.31) **
Intercept  -0.272  -3.191  0.135  0.222  -0.038  0.133  -0.175  -2.836
(0.95)  (3.91) **  (3.53) **  (1.48)  (0.50)  (0.68)  (0.56)  (3.39) *
3343
F-tests of joint significance
Death  (21.33) **  (15.29) **  (22.55) **  (30.01) **  (0.46)  (1.62)  (22.21) **  (20.29) **
Dropouts  (1.45)  (5.47) **  (0.42)  (15.29) **  (1.20)  (0.35)  (0.59)  (2.54) +
Davidson-Mackinnon
exogeneity test (F)  (7.39) **  (55.90) **  (0.71)  (6.07) **
R-squared  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.01)
Observations  3343  3343  3343  3343  3343  3343  3343  3343
No of hh  912  912  912  912  912  912  912  912
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses, unless noted.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%;  + significant at 10%
22Table 4.  Household Receipts of Transfers and Credit, Controlling for Endogeneity and Heterogeneity
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Net private transfers  Formal assistance  Net private credit
IV  EC2SLS  IV  EC2SLS  IV  EC2SLS
Death  17.506  16.215  5.549  0.250  3.208  2.681
(2.37) *  (3.21) **  (2.83) **  (0.29)  (1.89) +  (2.03)
Time since death  -0.575  -1.049  -0.155  0.195  -0.358  -0.280
(0.87)  (2.37) *  (0.88)  (3.40) **  (2.35) *  (2.33)
Time since death squared  -0.004  0.015  -0.003  -0.006  0.007  0.005
(0.23)  (1.53)  (0.67)  (4.75) **  (1.97) *  (2.03)
Left survey  15.214  -0.786  -4.387  0.073  -0.678  -0.067
(2.76) **  (0.90)  (3.00) **  (0.30)  (0.54)  (0.12)
Survey end  -4.911  -1.263  3.403  -0.071  -0.319  0.169
(1.09)  (1.34)  (2.84) *e  (0.24)  (0.31)  (0.27)
Elapsed time  45.878  18.855  7.216  4.719  1.636  1.668
(3.27) **  (2.19) *  (1.94) +  (2.74) **  (0.51)  (0.83)
Intercept  -5.867  -2.272  -0.803  -0.534  0.027  -0.101
(3.78)  **  (2.43) *  (1.95) +  (2.37) *  (0.08)  (0.41)
3343  3343
F-tests of joint
significance
Death  (5.81) **  (4.63)  **  (7.15) **  (10.18) **  (2.33) +  (2.03)
Time since death  (2.50) +  (3.63) *  (4.90) **  (11.28)  *'  (2.79) +  (2.75)
Dropouts  (3.94) *  (1.24)  (7.03) **  (0.08)  (0.24)  (0.30)
Davidson-MacKinnon
exogeity test (F)  (5.68) **  (47.61) **  (1.78)
Hausman test, RE v FE  (3.08)  (2.47)  (2.60)
RA2  within  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)
R^2 between  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)
RA2 overall  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Observations  3343  3343  3343  3343  3343  3343
No of hh  912  912  912  912  912  912
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses, unless noted.
* significant at 5%; **  significant at 1%; + significant at 10%
23Table 5. Household Receipts of Transfers and Credit, Controlling for Household Resources
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Net private transfers  Formal  assistance  Net  private credit  Total  net receipts
Death  10.941  0.481  3.016  15.280
(2.13)  *  (0.53)  (2.28) *  (2.68) **
Time since death  -0.792  0.140  -0.294  -1.025
(1.75) i  (2.03)  *  (2.40) *  (2.11)  *
Time since death squared  0.013  -0.004  0.006  0.016
(1.34)  (2.88) **  (2.09) *  (1.48)
Resources X death  9.382  -2.860  -0.990  4.499
(1.46)  (2.37)  (0.61)  (0.62)
Resources X time since death  -0.333  0.342  0.028  0.184
(0.43)  (2.60)  **  (0.14)  (0.21)
Resources X time since death  0.002  -0.006  0.000  -0.007
squared  (0.10)  (1.92) +  (0.01)  (0.34)
Elapsed time  12.174  4.162  1.960  19.101
(1.59)  (2.60) **  (1.06)  (2.15) *
Intercept  -1.308  -0.432  -0.190  -1.971
(1.40)  (2.14)*  (0.86)  (1.80) +
F-tests of joint significance
Death  (1.85)  (7.27) **  (1.97)  (2.90)  *
Resources X death  (347)  i  (5.11)  **  (0.79)  (2.73) *
Resources and death  (4.01)  **  (8.04)  **  (1.37)  (4.23)  **
Hausman test, RE v FE  (4.77)  (3.03)  (6.61)  (3.84)
RA2 within  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)
R^A2  between  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)
R^2 overall  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)
Observations  3343  3343  3343  3343
N of hhno  912  912  912  912
Predicted receipts following a death (thousand TSh per capita):
One month after the death
Poor  0.816  3.223  3.721  9.441
(0.10)  (2.26) *  (1.88) +  (1.08)
Rich  18.463  -1.698  1.846  18.559
(2.67)  **  (1.30)  (1.06)  (2.39) *
Six months after the death
Poor  -1.026  2.215  2.304  4.176
(0.22)  (2.39) *  (2.05)  *  (0.79)
Rich  13.504  0.228  0.704  14.604
(3.27)  *  (0.26)  (0.70)  (3.06)  **
Twelve months after the death
Poor  -2.486  1.118  0.969  -0.615
(0.75)  (1.60)  (1.21)  (0.16)
Rich  8.544  1.890  -0.294  10.465
(3.29) *  (3.32) *  (0.48)  (3.45) **
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses, unless noted.
*  significant at 5%; *  significant at 1%; + significant at 10%
24Figure 1.  Short-term Impact of Death on Food Expenditure and Food Consumption per Adult
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25Figure 2. Concentration Curves for Private Transfers, Private Credit, and Formal Assistance' 3
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3All per Adult  equivalent.
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26Figure 3. Predicted Net Private Transfer Receipts by Predicted Death (Thousand TSh)'4
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Predicted  Receipts  by Predicted  Death
14 Predicted  deaths come  from a linear  probability  model. Death is predicted  for observations  with  a predicted
probability  of death greater  than or equal to .5. The table below  describes  the prediction,  which  has a
corresponding  Pearson  chi 2' statistic  of 143.55.
I  I  Predicted  deaths
0  1  Total
X  X  °1392  495  1887
X  l  784  672  1456
Total  2176  1165  3343
Predicted  net transfer  receipts are taken from an error-correction  2SLS  regression  on death,  where  the first stage
is the linear  probability  model  of death,  and the second  stage  prediction  uses the fitted values from  the first
stage regression.
27Figure 4.  Total Assistance Received by Median Household Following a Death'5
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'5 The solid curve is the estimates  of the sum of net receipts  of private  transfers,  formal assistance,  and private
credit following  a death. The dashed  lines  show the 90% confidence  interval. The vertical  (left) axis depicts
the rate of receipts  in thousand  TSh per capita. The horizontal  line, labelled  on the right axis,  is the
counterfactual  estimate  of receipts  for households  that  have not suffered  a death. The impact  of a death  on
receipts  is computed  as the statistically  significant  difference  between  the solid curve and the counterfactual.  In
this figure,  death  has a statistically  significant  positive  impact  on the amount  received,  which  continues  for the
18 months  following  the death.
28Figure  5.  The Evolution  of Transfers,  Credit  and Assistance  Following  a Death
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16 See note 15. In this figure, death has no statistically significant impact on the amount of private transfers received by resource-poor households (5a), whereas
it increases the private transfers received by resource-rich households for up to 18 months (Sd).
29Figure  6. The  Evolution  of Transfers,  Credit  and  Assistance  Following  a Death' 7
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17 See note  15.
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